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OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DISTRICT 51
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SAPPER ATTACK
U-TAPAO AIRFIELD, THAILAND
10 JANUARY 1972

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**DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 12958
BY EXECUTIVE ORDER REVIEW TEAM**

DATE 3 Dec 2007 REVIEWER *cof*

This report is provided as a compilation of information concerning the January attack on U-Tapao Airfield. Investigation concerning identity and affiliation of the intruders is being conducted by Thai authorities. Information resulting from the Thai investigation will be disseminated as received.

J. Hunter
JENE D HUNTER, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

[Redacted]

Group 1
Date of next review interval:
Automatically declassified.

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*Map can be folded out for reference.

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INTRODUCTION

During the early morning hours of 10 January 1972, three intruders penetrated U-Tapao Airfield (UTAF) and caused \$26,000 damage to three B-52s parked in a revetment area. One of the intruders was killed during the attack. A second individual, believed to have been wounded by Security Police personnel, disappeared from an area near the B-52s and escaped. The third intruder did not take part in the attack. No US or friendly Thai personnel were killed or wounded in the attack.

This attack was the fourth of its kind directed against USAF assets in Thailand during the past four years. This was the first such assault against UTAf. No warning was received prior to the actual penetration. Although Communist Terrorist (CT) activity in the U-Tapao area is almost non-existent, UTAf is obviously a lucrative target since all B-52 missions now flown in Southeast Asia originate from this installation. The intruders in this attack were armed with hand guns and carried small, plastic wrapped explosive charges.

In this case, early detection and quick reaction by security personnel averted what could have been a disaster. The damage potential was extreme since all of the aircraft attacked were fueled and loaded with bombs. Since they were discovered prior to gaining access to the aircraft parking area, the intruders were forced to hurry their mission.

The specific intent of the attack was apparently to damage or destroy B-52 aircraft. The destruction of even one B-52 would have provided the Communists an outstanding opportunity for propaganda exploitation. The dead intruder's facial characteristics indicate possible Vietnamese ethnic

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origin; however, as in the January 1970 Ubon attack, neither the intruder's identity nor the group they represented has been identified to this point.

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THE ATTACK

(The reference points used in this account are found on the attached fold out map).

At approximately 0220 hours on 10 January 1972, K9-3, a walking canine patrol, was proceeding along the Munitions Maintenance Access Road between bunkers I-45 and I-46. K9-3's dog alerted and he observed two individuals dressed in camouflaged fatigues lying on the ground 10 to 15 feet in front of him (point 3). The two intruders began shooting at K9-3 with hand guns, firing several rounds at him. While K9-3 was attempting to take cover, the two intruders got up and ran in a southerly direction toward the concertina wire (point 10) still firing as they ran.

Just before the encounter between K9-3 and the intruders, a Security Policeman on duty at location I-47 had observed three individuals on the north side of the MAS access road walking south. Two of the individuals were walking together and the third was approximately 10 to 15 feet to their rear. When first observed, they were about 30 yards southeast of the canine kennel access road. I-47 heard the shots fired at K9-3 and saw two men run through the concertina wire and they continue toward the B-52 revetment area. I-47 radioed the initial report of penetration to Combat Security Control (CSC) at 0222 hours when he heard the shots fired at K9-3.

The Thai Guard (TG) on duty at Bunker I-46 heard the initial gunshots and observed two individuals together and a third man approximately 10 to 15 feet from them. This observation was made while the TG was standing outside his bunker. After entering the bunker, he saw two men breach the concertina wire and run toward the B-52s. I-46 exited his bunker and

challenged them in both English and Thai since he could not ascertain the intruders' nationality. Neither man stopped, but continued toward the revetments. I-46 saw the third man recross the MMS access road and run in a northwesterly direction in the vicinity of the kennel road junction. I-46 said he radioed CSC, reported the gunfire and the breaching of the concertina, and requested permission to fire. He was told to fire if the intruders were armed; however, since he saw no weapons and could not determine exactly who was firing, he did not fire. I-46 followed the two intruders and saw them reach the north side of revetment Mike 1 where aircraft #6662 was parked. The two intruders set down a box like object and one man ran around the revetment wall into Mike 1. Very shortly he returned, both men couched down, and I-46 heard an explosion. The two men then ran in a southerly direction around the revetment in front of Mike row and I-46 lost sight of them. I-46 reported the explosion and returned to his bunker. He subsequently heard two more explosions and reported both to CSC.

MICHAEL K MOLPUS, Sgt, 307th Organizational Maintenance Squadron (OMS), indicated that at approximately 0230 hours, he was standing on the aircraft parked in revetment Mike 2 when he heard an explosion in Mike 1. He walked around the revetment wall to see what happened and saw two men running around the left wing of the aircraft in Mike 1. One of the individuals rounded the wall and approached within two feet of MOLPUS pointing a handgun at him. The intruder pulled the trigger three times; however, the gun failed to fire. The individual said something which did not sound like Thai, turned and ran to the B-52 parked in Mike 2. The intruder then attempted to throw a charge in number 5 or 6 engine; however, the charge

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fell off the aircraft and exploded on the ramp (see Attachment 5). MOLPUS described this individual as approximately five feet tall and having very dark skin. The weapon was described as resembling ".22 six-shooter." Both men wore camouflaged fatigues and were orientals.

JOHN D RHODES, Sgt, 307th CMS, was working with MOLPUS and was inside the aircraft parked in Mike 2 when he heard an explosion and felt the aircraft shake. RHODES exited the aircraft and stood on the ramp looking for MOLPUS. He saw the two men round the revetment wall and head toward Mike 2 aircraft. RHODES saw sparks flash from something one of the individuals had in front of his body, and saw the man attempt to throw an object into engine pod number three (engines 5 and 6). The object fell to the ramp under the pod and exploded almost on impact with the ground. The intruders continued running toward the rear of the aircraft and then along the wall separating revetments Mike 2 and 3. As they reached the front of the revetment, one of the intruders threw an object toward Mike 3 and RHODES heard an explosion.

JOHN M BURNS, Sgt, 307th CMS, was working inside the aircraft parked in Mike 3 when he heard two explosions approximately 10 or 15 seconds apart. BURNS exited the aircraft and approached a Munitions Maintenance truck parked near the nose of the aircraft. While standing near the front of the truck, BURNS saw a small man with oriental features running from the area of Mike 2 toward Mike 3. As the man did so, he threw an object toward BURNS and the truck. A small explosion similar to a firecracker went off approximately 15 feet in front of BURNS. Almost immediately BURNS heard an explosion from the area of the Mike 3 aircraft. BURNS ran for safety and approximately seven or eight minutes later returned to the area and found a hand grenade

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(see Attachment 6) lying on the ramp under the nose of the aircraft.

GARY V GLENDANIEL, Sgt, 307th OAS, was working inside the aircraft parked in Mike 3 at approximately 0230 hours when he heard an explosion. He departed the aircraft and shortly thereafter heard a second explosion. GLENDANIEL went to the front of the aircraft and saw a man dressed in camouflaged fatigues running near Mike 2. GLENDANIEL sought cover on the MMS truck parked in front of Mike 3. As he neared the truck, he saw one of the intruders throw an explosive device at the number three or four engine pod. The device fell back to the ramp and exploded.

SUMMARY: After reaching Mike Row, the penetrators placed one satchel charge in the number seven engine of B-52 #6662 parked in the Mike 1 revetment. This device caused the first explosion (see Attachments 3 and 4). The two intruders then ran across the front of Mike 2. One man ran directly to the rear of the aircraft while the other attempted to throw a satchel charge into the number five or six engine. This charge fell to the ground and exploded. This individual then also ran to the rear of the aircraft and both ran along the revetment wall between Mike 2 and 3 and headed toward the aircraft parked in Mike 3. One satchel charge was thrown at engines seven and eight, but also fell to the ground and exploded, almost in the same position as at Mike 2. Two additional charges were placed in the area which did not explode. One was found inside the air intake engine number four of the aircraft parked in Mike 3 and the other was lying on a concrete revetment shelf behind that aircraft. Both of these charges were found by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and were subsequently disarmed.

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After the events related above, the two intruders apparently planned to continue in a southerly direction along Mike Row. However, they exited Mike 3 to proceed south, a Security Guard who had heard the explosions, was walking north along Mike Row in front of Mike 4 when he saw the two men exit Mike 3. The guard attempted to fire three times, but each time his weapon jammed. The Security Guard then ducked into Mike 4 and the two intruders turned left and escaped from the area going east through the opening between Mike 3 and 4 (Point 5). The exact route of the two men from that point has not been determined; however, one of the intruders was subsequently found dead at point 7.

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DAMAGE AND ESTIMATES

Total cost and manhour repair requirements for the damaged aircraft were reportedly as follows:

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>MANHOURS REQUIRED FOR REPAIR</u>	<u>COST</u>
Mike 1 (A/C #6662)	18	\$25,000.00
Mike 2 (A/C #6689)	2	500.00
Mike 3 (A/C #6660)	<u>2</u>	<u>500.00</u>
TOTALS	22	\$26,000.00

Aircraft #6662 parked in Mike 1 sustained the most serious damage which included the loss of engine number seven. Other damage included several small patchable holes, one in a bombbay door, one in the fuselage above the right forward wheel well door, and one on the number six engine mount. Damage to the aircraft #6689 was limited to patchable holes in the number five and six engines. Damage to aircraft #6660 was limited to repairable holes in the lower cowling of number seven engine.

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METHOD OF ENTRY AND POSTTRACK ACTIONS

The most probable point of initial base perimeter penetration is located to the north of the B-52 parking area in the vicinity of Tower 42 (points 1 and 2). Two cuts in the perimeter fence were found in this area: one approximately 50 yards south of T-42 and the other approximately 50 yards west of the tower. The perimeter fence at these points consists of triangular stacked triple rolls of concertina wire. Approximately five yards inside the concertina is a line of barbed double apron wire (tanglefoot).

The area between T-42 and the Munitions Maintenance Access Road is characterized by dense foliage. Under cover of darkness, with this ground cover, the intruders could have made their way south to the access road where they were first discovered. (NOTE: The dash line on the map from points 1 and 2 to the access road is merely a suspected route. The actual route could just as easily have been around the west side of the kennels. There was no physical evidence which would indicate exact route of travel). On 11 February a Thai Security Guard found a set of 7" wire cutters approximately five feet outside the fence near point 2. The cutters are stamped "Poland" and investigation concerning their origin is continuing.

Another possible point of intruder entry was the U-Tapao east gate aboard bomb trucks carrying ordnance to the munitions storage area. All bomb trucks enter the base through the East Gate (located at the point where the IAS access road turns north and off the base at Sukhumvit Highway). The swing shift East Gate US Security Police guard related that he had admitted about forty to fifty bomb trucks on base prior to 2400 hours and at 0010 when he went off duty, there were about eight trucks at the gate.

The midnight shift East Gate US Security Police (USARP) came on duty at about 0010 and confirmed the presence of eight or nine trucks outside the gate. The guard called for permission to allow the trucks to proceed on base, and permission was received at approximately 0130 hours. The guard recorded the number of each of the nine trucks as they entered the base. He stated he also checked all base passes of persons on the trucks and searched the beds of the trucks. Although entry by the intruders aboard the bomb trucks cannot be completely discounted, it is considered a less likely method than through the perimeter fence. Thai Police authorities are conducting investigation concerning drivers of the nine trucks which entered U-Tapao after 2400 hours.

After being discovered by K9-3 at point 3, two intruders proceeded south through the concertina wire and into the B-52 parking area. The IG at I-46 observed the third intruder recross the access road in the vicinity of the kamel road junction and head in a northwesterly direction. A satchel charge was found at this road junction in a concrete drainage ditch. The third man could have dropped it as he was fleeing.

The third intruder disappeared from view as he crossed the access road. His exit route from that point is merely speculation. He may have worked his way north toward the general area of T-42 and cut his way out at either points 1 or 2. Assuming entry was gained through the perimeter fence near T-42, this would explain the second cut in the fence.

The other two intruders proceeded to the B-52 area as explained in the previous section. After leaving the area between Mike 3 and 4, the exact route is unknown. One of these two died from a gunshot wound in

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the head while trying to exit the base at point 7. His suspected route from point 5 to point 7 is indicated by the dashed line although his exact route cannot be determined.

Two possibilities exist as to the route of the second intruder from point 5.

a. He may have taken the same route as the first intruder, working his way to the vicinity of point 7. As the first intruder crossed the berm to the point where he was found dead, a short gunfight ensued. The second man may have started trying to work his way back out of the area to try another route. The firing at point 7 took place at 0251 hours. At 0302, the guard in Tower 1 (west of the area where the first intruder was found shot) reported observing an unidentified individual crossing his area and running in a southwesterly direction toward the B-52 area. Approximately ten minutes later (0312 hours) Security Police Team Charlie-4 was making a sweep of the field area to the east of Mike Row. The team joined with Bravo-1 in the field area east of Mike 8, proceeded north to Mike 1 and then reversed themselves going south to about point 8. They observed an individual climbing the barbed wire fence approximately 50 yards east of their location and 50 feet south of Tower 17 (point 6). One member of Charlie-4 fired a burst with an M-16 and a second member fired three bursts with an M-60 machine gun at the individual. Both men observed the individual topple head first over the fence to the east side. At that time, CSC notified the team to cease fire since another team (Bravo-5) was on the other side of the fence and may have been in the line of fire. Both Bravo-5 and Charlie-4 held their positions for about ten minutes before going to the area where the man had fallen off the

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fence. Bravo-5 had seen the individual on the fence when the gunfire broke out and verified he had fallen, but could not be sure on which side of the fence he fell. When both teams converged on the spot, the man was gone. Bravo 5 related it would have been virtually impossible for the man to have continued across the field area east of the fence and gain entry into the bomb storage area as there is almost no cover in that field. The grass is at most three inches high in this area. The most likely escape route the second intruder took was to crawl back through the fence and into the nearby ditch about five feet west of the fence line. This ditch is eight to ten feet wide, four to six feet deep and has tall, thick grass growing along its sides and bottom. The man may have taken refuge here temporarily and proceeded south to exit the base in the southeast quadrant. Subsequent inquiry disclosed that 29 trip flares between towers 7 and 23 (see map) were inoperative.

There is a possibility that the primary escape route the penetrators had intended to follow was to continue down the Mike flow in a southerly direction and to exit the southeast section of the base. Obviously they were diverted as they departed Mike 3. The large open area in the southeast section of the base (see map) is characterized by thick, almost jungle like vegetation. At 0405 hours, Tower 23 reported hearing a small boat close to the beach proper. PDRG (helicopter) was dispatched to the area and reported nothing unusual. There were several fishing boats in the area, but none near the coastline. The report of a boat near the beach, plus the fact that the dead intruder was wearing swimming trunks under his clothing, lends credence to the possibility that this may have been the planned exit route.

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INVEST REPORT

As reported elsewhere in this report, one intruder was killed during the attack and died at point 7 (also see attachments 9-10) about 50 yards east of Tower 2 and 30 yards from the point where K9-4 was located. The dead intruder was dressed in commercially made camouflage-fatigues which can be purchased in U-Tapao and other areas of Thailand. He also wore a commercially available camouflage soft hat. Around the individual's waist was wound a 3½ foot length of printed cotton material. Under his fatigues, the intruder was wearing civilian clothes which consisted of a maroon sport shirt, small size, bearing the label "New Sport Men's Ware"; a pair of black slacks; and a "Jacob" brand black leather belt. On his feet the man wore dark colored, high topped tennis shoes (brand name "Bar One"). He also wore a 17 jewel waterproof Seiko watch (SN: 972967), and a black Smith and Wesson leather holster. Underneath the civilian clothes the intruder wore a pair of swimming trunks of knitted material in maroon with red, yellow, white and blue stripes. The man's pockets held a flashlight and other items which included an ID card (attachment 11 and 12), a Thai credit note, a flight ticket for a Bangkok Airways flight dated in November 1971, and a small medical kit containing six penicillin tablets, two lozenges and a roll of gauze bandage. The second man who participated in the placing of satchel charges was apparently dressed similarly to the dead man described above. Initial reports from both an American Security Policeman and one Thai Guard stated that the men were dressed in camouflage fatigues. Additionally, at the point where the two men crossed the concertina wire between I-45 and I-46, a torn one inch square of material was

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found on the ground. The material was identical to that found tied around the dead man's waist. Since the dead man's waist band was not torn, it is assumed that the small square case from a similar band worn by the second intruder.

Ordinance items found on the dead man included 15 rounds of lead slug .38 caliber ammunition (two expended), the base of which contained the notations "W-W" in the 12 o'clock position and a "38 Special" in the six o'clock position; five chemical pencil fuzes (attachments 6 and 7); two plastic wrapped explosive charges with friction fuzes and one hand grenade similar to the Soviet type F-1. The grenade had no markings and may be a Chinese Communist copy of the F-1 (see attachment 17).

Thai officials viewing the body of the intruder concluded that the man was of Vietnamese extraction. Investigation by Thai authorities to identify the individual are continuing.

The weapon which was found in the dead intruder's hand is a five-shot, .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver, Model M36-1. The frame serial number is 83739 (or B). The last number was slightly blurred and difficult to read. The butt serial number is 437482. OSI inquiry indicates that Smith and Wesson Model M36-1 revolvers with serial numbers 83738 and 83739 were sold to separate gun dealers in Maryland and Kentucky in 1957. Efforts to trace this weapon to Thailand are continuing.

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ENEMY ORDNANCE AND EQUIPMENT RECOVERED

Ordnance items recovered included three general types of explosive charges, pencil-type chemical delay fuzes, pull-friction fuzes, and Russian/Chinese type fragmentation hand grenades. As discussed elsewhere in this report, the fuzes and grenades were identical to those used in previous attacks against USAF assets in Thailand.

The explosive charges (see Attachment 6) were of three types: one composed entirely of C-3 explosive, one composed of C-3 and a black material described by EOD personnel as CHICOM plastic explosive, and a third composed entirely of the CHICOM plastic. These three types could be distinguished by their wrappers in two ways. Those charges containing the CHICOM plastic were wrapped in a purple material that appeared similar to that used for shower curtains. This wrapping had a flower design impregnated in the material. Those charges composed entirely of C-3 were also wrapped in plastic, but the material had no design and was olive drab in color. All of the charges were bound with plastic string commonly available in Thailand. All of the six charges recovered after the attack had two holes drilled in the ends. In one hole was placed a pull-friction fuze. The other hole was filled by a short pointed bamboo stick. Apparently if the pencil chemical fuze was to be used, the stick was pulled and the fuze inserted in the hole. According to USAF Technical Order 11A-1-58, Section III, C-3 (Composition 3) is principally used as a main charge and for general use in combat areas. It can be detonated by military blasting caps, electric or nonelectric detonators. It has a velocity of detonation of 26,000 feet per second, and has a relative effectiveness as an external charge (as compared to 1.00 for TNT) of 1.34. It has good water resistant capabilities.

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The pull-friction fuzes were of a standard design that has been found in other SEA areas. They also appeared similar to those used in the January 1970 Ubon RTAFB attack. The principle of the workings of such fuzes is shown in Attachment 15. These are quick acting fuzes and have a delay of approximately five seconds. It was one of this type that was apparently used on the aircraft in Mike 1. The lack of reliability and quality of this fuze is illustrated by the two unexploded charges found in the Mike 3 area, one in the number four engine of B-52 #6660 and the other on the concrete revetment shelf to the rear of the aircraft. The fuzes in both of these charges had been activated but failed to detonate.

The recovered pencil chemical fuzes (See Attachment 6 and 7) appeared identical to those used during the January 1970 Ubon attack. The fuze containers were all a dark maroon plastic with a screw top. The containers all had either two or three painted dots near the base. These dots are raised and appear to be used for determining the time of delay for the fuze inside. In the case of a container with two dots, the number two is impressed into the detonator portion of the fuze. Those with three dots have the number three on the fuze. A laboratory analysis completed on a similar type fuze following the discovery of a 20 April 1969 cache near Ubon, disclosed the explosive in the fuze to be composed of 85% Pentaerythrite Tetranitrate (PETN) and 10.7% Dibutyltinlaid, a plasticizer. The other 4.3% of the material was not given. This compound was determined to be roughly equivalent to Composition 4 (1.3 TNT) explosive, undoubtedly a factory-produced substance. The principal of the chemical fuze is illustrated in Attachment 16. The fuzes used at UTAF were also booby-trapped. The wire

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connected to the spring located behind the plunger is also attached to the screw threads of the screw at the top of the fuse. The wire is broken by anyone rotating this screw and if the safety ring is not in place, the plunger will detonate the charge. According to the previous reports, these fuzes are quite similar to the Soviet MY-8 chemical long delay fuze.

The hand grenades recovered were apparently either a Soviet or CHICOM version of the F-1 fragmentation grenade. Characteristics of this grenade are shown in Attachment 17. The grenades bore no markings which would indicate the country of origin.

MEDICAL.

A partial autopsy of the dead intruder was conducted by Thai medical personnel at the Royal Thai Naval Hospital, Sattahip, Thailand, on 11 January 1972. A USAF flight surgeon was present during the examination. According to the US doctor, there was only an entrance wound (see Attachment 13) and no exit wound. The wound was apparently circular and a badly deformed lead bullet was removed from the temporal lobe of the brain at a point one inch straight inside the entrance wound. The doctor was unsure of the bullet caliber, but stated it was larger than an M-16 bullet.

NOTE: Thai Police investigating the incident have stated they believe the intruder committed suicide rather than be captured. However, the two expended rounds found in his gun were reportedly fired at K9-4 at point 7 on the map. No US Security Police or TC personnel are issued lead ammunition and carry only jacketed military rounds. The slug taken from the intruder's head was subsequently weighed at 119.6 grains. A normal M-16 bullet weighs 55 grains while commercial .38 caliber lead ammo comes in both 158 and 200 grain sizes. Laboratory analysis of the death bullet revealed that it is of identical spectographic composition with those unfired bullets recovered from the intruder's body.

The wound was located $\frac{1}{2}$ " anterior to the right ear. Except for evidence of massive hemorrhage in the dura between the skull and the brain, damage was limited to a contusioned area on the left side of the brain. This was reportedly caused by the shock power of the bullet entering the head. The US doctor saw no evidence of trauma which would be expected in the case of a bullet penetrating to the left side of the brain. He

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stated that if he had to hazard a guess as to the cause of death, it would have been the excessive bleeding inside the skull and not the penetrating bullet hitting a vital center in the brain. Qualified USAF medical personnel advised that a man with a bullet located as described above, might be able to move a considerable distance before dying.

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BACKGROUND AND COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS ATTACKS

The UTAF incident is the fourth attack directed against USAF installations since the initial intrusion at Udorn Airfield in July 1968. All of the attacks have been similar in nature, i.e., "sapper attacks" composed of a small number of individuals carrying explosive charges targeted against USAF aircraft.

Reports of Communist Terrorist activity in the vicinity of UTAF are rare and confirmation of such activity almost nonexistent. Several low-level reports, all unconfirmed and from untested sources, have indicated the presence of strangers in the UT area; however, details were lacking in these reports. The last OSI report of strangers in the USAF area was received in August 1971 when six individuals, allegedly speaking with an accent common to Northeast Thailand, were reported seeking jobs in the area.

The following chart provides a comparison for the four attacks on US tenanted installations:

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS


The U-Tapao attack does not appear to have been as well planned as previous attacks on USAF tenanted installations. Although the intruders probably spent a considerable period of time gathering information on entry and egress routes, they apparently did not do their ordnance homework well. The size and composition of the explosive charges and the intruder's attempts to throw them into engine nacelles indicates a lack of knowledge of B-52 size and construction.

The small number of intruders, their lack of automatic weapons, and their possession of time delay fuzes, all indicate they hoped to carry out the intrusion without being detected although they must have known that the chances of doing so was extremely slight. The "suicide" nature of this intrusion signifies the dedication of the participants.

There can be little doubt that the specific target of the intruders was the B-52 aircraft. This targeting of aircraft as opposed to more easily hit assets has been consistent in all four intrusions.

The relative degree of success or failure of the U-Tapao attack depends on who is making the assessment. From the Communist standpoint, they infiltrated three intruders into a heavily defended US position, damaged three expensive US aircraft, and recovered two of the attackers. The loss of only one man, when measured against the satisfaction and propaganda value derived from such an effort, clearly marks the success of the mission. From the American side, the early detection of the intruders and their failure to significantly affect US combat posture, makes the attack a failure.

Regardless of which viewpoint is accepted, the U-Tapao attack serves to reaffirm the contention that small groups of well-trained, dedicated individuals can penetrate US tented installations in Thailand.




ATTACHMENT 1

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
I-45


ATTACHMENT 2






















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
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วันออกบัตร



บัตรหมดอายุ


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ประเทศไทย





FRICTION IGNITER



BLASTING CAP
DETONATOR

BLASTING CAP
DETONATOR

EXPLOSIVE
CHARGE


FRICTION PULL WIRE

CHEMICAL FIRING DEVICE

This firing device may be employed by the VC for sabotage purposes. It is attached to mines and demolition charges. Its delay is between 20 and 38 minutes.

FUNCTIONING. The copper sulfate tube is broken and the solution reacts on the metal wire securing the firing pin. The wire is weakened and breaks, allowing the spring driven firing pin to strike the primer, resulting in detonation of the charge.

DISARMING. Once the firing device has been initiated, there is no way to safe the device. In an extreme emergency, unscrew the firing device and place it away from the charge. Evacuate the area and wait at least one hour before returning to examine the device.



CHEMICAL FIRING DEVICE

SOURCE: VC-NVA Employment of Mines & Booby Traps, COMEC, 1 June 1967


SOVIET DEFENSIVE HAND GRENADE TYPE F-1

The F-1 type hand grenade is similar in appearance and operations to those of the US MK.2 grenade. Its case is of serrated cast iron and painted olive drab.


To use, the grenade body, with safety lever, is held with one hand and its safety pin is pulled with the other. When thrown, the safety lever of the grenade springs up, loosening the spring of the firing pin which ignites the primer. This initiates the delay fuze which explodes the grenade.

CHARACTERISTICS






Type	Defensive, serrated cast iron
Use	Antipersonnel
Weight	0.690 kg (1.54 pounds)
Length	124mm (4.87 inches)
Diameter	55mm (2.1 inches)
Fuze delay	3 to 5 seconds
Average throwing range	33 to 45 m (34 to 47 yds, approx)
Effective fragmentation radius	14 meters (16 yards, approx)



SOVIET DEFENSIVE HAND GRENADE
TYPE F-1







LEGEND

-  EXIST. BARRIAGE
-  EXIST. TEMPORARY
-  SUSPECTED ROUTES
-  CONFIRMED ROUTES
-  CONCERTINA

KEY



-  FENCE CUTS
-  GUARD TOWERS
-  BUNKERS
-  KYRGYZ PATROL

A-14
7-22

A-14
7-21

A-14
7-19

A-14
7-19

FIELD

