

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 1326 COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96337

3 Oct 72

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SP

Combat Operations After Action Report

7/13AF (SP)

1. NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION: Support attack against Udon RTAFB, Udon Thani Province, Thailand.

2. TIME AND DATE: 0050 hours local, 3 October 1972.

3. LOCATION: Udon RTAFB, Udon Thani, Thailand.

4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force (PACAF).

5. TASK ORGANIZATION:

- a. 432nd Tactical Fighter Wing
- b. 432nd Combat Support Group
- c. 1974th Communications Group
- d. 432nd USAF Hospital
- e. 432nd Civil Engineering Squadron
- f. 432nd Munitions Maintenance Squadron (EOD)
- g. 223rd Composite Squadron, RTAF
- h. 15th Regimental Combat Team, RTA
- i. Udon Military District

6. COMMANDERS ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS:

- a. Col Scott G. Smith, Commander 432nd TFW.
- b. Col Harry H. Elmore, Jr., Commander 15th RCT

MAXWELL/CAB AL 8012

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- c. Col Theodore F. DeMarco, Commander 1974th Communications Group.
- d. Col William T. Kemmerer, Commander 432nd USAF Hospital.
- e. Lt Col George F. Francis, Commander 432nd CES.
- f. Major Robert B. Gordon, Commander 432nd MMS.
- g. Major Prachoom Chaisiri, Commander Udorn RTAFB.
- h. Colonel Pak Meenakanit, Commander, 13 RCT.
- i. Major General Chua Sukhee, Commanding General, Udorn Military District.

7. (C) SECURITY FORCE STATUS: At the time of the attack, the security force consisted of 307 men. 150 of the on duty force were USAF Security Policemen, 17 augmentee Security Policemen and 140 were members of the Thai Security Guard (TSG) Force, 2nd Company, 4th Battalion. The strength of the 432nd Security Police Squadron was 351 enlisted and 5 officer personnel. 4 enlisted personnel were on leave or TDY at the time of the attack, resulting in an on base strength of 348 enlisted plus 5 officers. A total of 439 Thai Guards are assigned. As a result of the attack 157 USAF Security Policemen, 69 Thai Guards and 80 trained augmentees were recalled and posted by 0210 hours local. Within 1 1/2 hours after the attack 613 USAF and friendly Thai forces were on post or available for dispatch.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE: The month preceding the attack showed marked increase of insurgent activity near the base and there was an indication that an attack was planned, however, no date was given. The base was in Alert Condition YELLOW due to the 1 October 1972 mortar attack on Ubon RTAFB.

9. (C) EXECUTION:

0050 hours: Bravo Sector Supervisor reported to CSC that the Thai Security Guard K-9 handler posted on A-41 had been injured and had run from his post to the sentry on E-90 to report that he had been injured by two unidentified individuals (UI). The TSG's radio had been damaged and his facial injuries prevented intelligible speech, but he conveyed that he thought one of the UI's had thrown a stone or brick at him. He did not report a gunshot nor did adjacent posted sentries hear the gunshot that had damaged his radio and inflicted facial injuries. Blocking units were deployed between the point of contact and the aircraft.

0100 hours: Bravo Sector Supervisor reported two UI's had been observed inside the walls of November Revetment. The area was surrounded by deploying units.

0109 hours: Two USAF K-9 handlers entered November Revetment to flush

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out the UI's (still believed to be non-hostile). Security Alert Team (SAT) deployed to provide close cover in front of blocking forces.

0110 hours: UI's inside November Revetment responded with grenades and automatic weapons fire. One USAF K-9 handler and USAF and TSG SAT members wounded by grenade fragments. SECON Red I declared by CSP. Fire returned by blocking forces ASAP after friendly forces cleared from close contact.

0145 hours: UI's sporadically continued fire with small arms and automatic weapons. One UI was observed atop the Revetment wall and fire was directed at him. One UI was seen between the revetment walls at ground level attempting to exfiltrate. Fire was directed at him and he returned to the revetment wall.

0215 hours: Automatic weapons fire reported in the vicinity of A-31 (Machinegun Bunker on Southwest perimeter). Sector Supervisor deployed to vicinity of A-31 to provide flare support. Quick Reaction Team deployed for fire support.

0240 hours: An extremely large explosion occurred between Bldg 1862 and the rear of November Revetment. Windows in building 1862 were shattered.

0300 hours: Automatic weapons fire and an explosion reported in the vicinity of A-31. Sporadic small arms fire reported in Alpha Sector over the next hour. Small arms fire continued at November Revetment.

0325 hours: Numerous reports of UI's North of aircraft revetments were received. Responding elements were unable to establish contact or verify presence of UI's. No evidence of enemy presence North of aircraft revetments ever detected. Sightings believed to be result of nerves and extremely poor visibility.

0330 hours: Thai and Vietnamese interpreters employed at November Revetment with bullhorns to call upon enemy to surrender. No response other than sporadic small arms fire.

0411 hours: Tower sentry on Southwest perimeter reported TSG K-9 handler on adjacent post under fire and believed to be hit.

0415 hours: Flare and searchlight aircraft arrived over the base and began illumination.

0417 hours: A volunteer group of 4 USAF K-9 handlers began a sweep from the kennels to the area where posted TSG K-9 handler believed hit. Small arms fire and grenades pinned them down on their approach.

0500 hours: 13th RCT ordered to dispatch a platoon to coordinates TE 640225, Southwest of the base.

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0515 hours: USMC helicopter employed to hover USAF riflemen directly over November Revetment walls. It did not draw fire and verified that revetment walls were clear. A sweep of revetment area began by deployed ground force. Sweep detected fragments of human body scattered over area of approximately 100 meters, generally centered from area of massive explosion at 0240 hours. An intact body dressed in dark blue denim, believed to be deceased, was detected at the Southwest corner of November Revetment huddled around satchel charges and grenades. EOD summoned. Action terminated at November Revetment.

From 0530 through 0600, numerous sightings were reported of UI's exfiltrating South out of Alpha Sector. Six confirmed UI's successfully exfiltrated. Small arms fire received from off base during exfiltration from unknown number of automatic weapons.

0600 hours: Platoon from 13th RCT arrived at TS 640225 and began to sweep the area outside Southwest base perimeter.

0613 hours: Units sweeping Alpha Sector detected body of TSG K-9 reported hit at 0411. Sentry dog was uninjured and laying over his deceased handler. Satchel charges emplaced in the area surrounding the body. EOD notified.

0625 hours: One USAF Security Policeman wounded by detonation of explosive fuse on roadway near November Revetment.

0700 hours: Fence line and concertina breach detected in area of Alpha 31.

0800 hours: RTAF Quick Reaction Force responded to base perimeter vicinity Alpha 29.

0815 hours: Sapper believed to be deceased at Southwest corner of November Revetment regained consciousness but was unable to respond to orders in Thai or Vietnamese to move away from his explosives. EOD personnel still unavailable and sapper appeared critically wounded. On scene personnel dragged sapper from area of his explosives, cleared body and rendered first aid prior to the arrival of ambulance. Wounded sapper evacuated from area at approximately 0830.

0830 hours: The 13th RCT platoon engaged an enemy force of undetermined size at TE 64522. This engagement resulted in one enemy KIA. Contact was broken by the enemy.

From 0830 to 1100, small arms fire was received along southwest perimeter from off-base and was returned. One RTAF infantryman deployed on base was wounded by this fire. All firing ceased at 1100; SECON reduced to GREY at 1130 hours.

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0900 hours: The 13th RCT platoon again engaged the enemy force at TE 641230. This engagement resulted in one enemy KIA. Contact was broken at 1000 hours. At that time 13th RCT requested assistance for the purpose of attempting to reestablish contact with the enemy force.

1100 hours: A Special Action Force (SAF) platoon arrived to assist the 13th RCT platoon in a continuing sweep of the area. This effort continued until 1600 hours. No further contact with the enemy was effected.

1559 hours: B-91 reported an explosion in Alpha Sector. A-2 advised it came from the Coast Guard area. EOD, Mobile Command Post and Fire Department dispatched. One satchel charge had exploded and caused minor damage to a building, one more satchel charge was found under a building and was removed and destroyed by EOD. Area declared safe by Mobile Command Post at 1637 hours.

10. (C) RESULTS:

a. US and Free World Forces:

- (1) Killed in action: 1
- (2) Wounded in action: 6
- (3) Missing in action: 0
- (4) Aircraft destroyed: 0
- (5) Aircraft damaged: 0
- (6) Facilities/material damaged/destroyed: Windows shattered and minor roof damage at building 1862. Slight structural damage to Coast Guard building.

b. Enemy:

- (1) Killed in action: 3
- (2) Captured: 1
- (3) Wounded in action: 1
- (4) Equipment and material losses:

(a) Satchel Charges: 10 recovered and approximately 8 to 10 were destroyed. The weight of the charges was 2 lbs. The size was 3" X 2 3/4". The filler was plastic explosive comparable to US composition C-3. Initiation was pull friction, delay 0 - 3 seconds. Chemical pencil initiation was also used. Random delay up to 10 hours. These items were booby trapped.

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(b) Chemical Pencils: Of Russian origin, used to provide random delays in the satchel charges. These items were also booby trapped. Recovered one that had not been initiated. All others functioned as designed.

(c) Grenades: Three each recovered. They were offensive type grenades. Two had a Russian 4 second delay fuse inserted in the CHICOM baseball type grenade. One grenade was a CHICOM can type with a pull friction type initiator.

(d) TNT: One $\frac{1}{2}$ lb block of CHICOM origin.

(e) Mine: Double fused, believed to be of CHICOM manufacture. Suction cups attached to base of mine for attaching to the underside or to the side of objects. Mousetrap fuse will not function until moved. Once activated the metal fatigue fuse continues to operate after pin has been replaced. Extremely dangerous.

(f) Two cloth satchels for carrying charges.

(g) Thirteen containers for chemical pencils.

(h) Two type 58 Czechoslovakian rifles (basically - AK 47).

(i) Russian 9mm pistol.

(j) Two (2) magazines containing a total of 15 rounds of 9mm ammunition.

(k) Three magazines containing a total of 108 rounds of 7.62 ammunition.

(l) 111 Baht (\$5.55 USC equivalent).

11. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Plans:

(1) OPLAN 207-72, Base Defense Plan. This plan is considered adequate. SECON YELLOW was in effect at the outset of the attack. SECON RED was declared immediately upon determination that hostile elements had penetrated the installation and more than the required amount of defense forces were available in minimum time to man required SECON RED posts. Strengths apparent in the plan center around the high number of quick reaction teams available to respond to the multitude of fire fights which developed over a wide section of the base perimeter and to sweep the area of penetration.

(2) USMC Military District Joint Base Defense Plan. Provisions of the plan which call for response to known hostile events are considered adequate. However, the plan is not considered adequate for the entire spectrum of conditions short of an actual overt attack. The following are major inadequacies of the plan:

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(a) Base Defense Security Control (BDSC) is not routinely staffed by the representative of the District Commander, nor are representatives of friendly forces tasked with the exterior base defense present in the defense center. With the exception of U.S. personnel, this control center does not function for all practical purposes until after an actual attack has commenced.

(b) Friendly forces tasked with external base defense do not provide patrol coverage during the hours of darkness.

(c) Because BDSC is not staffed by Thai representatives, with authority to direct the employment of friendly forces, needless delays are experienced in execution of tasks by external forces once an attack has began.

b. Communications: When CSC is utilizing all four channels on the Non-tactical radio net the frequencies have a tendency to cross-feed onto other channels. The 1974th Communications Group personnel have recommended separating the master stations and utilizing a combination of master and remote stations within CSC. This would be far less expensive than changing crystals on all of our radios to achieve a desired frequency separation. By relocating two of the master transmitter stations, communications personnel state that our cross-feed problems should be eliminated. At this time one remote unit is on order and consideration is being given to place a second remote unit on order.

c. Transportation:

(1) Immediately prior to the attack, one of two M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers was deadlined when one of its tracks separated and was thrown from the vehicle. The tracks on the other M-113 were badly worn. Most of Alpha Sector cannot be traversed by any other vehicle. Both M-113's are now VDP for tracks. New tracks have been on order for six (6) months.

(2) All vehicles (M-151, M-715, M-35, M-706, & M-113) are 1966 to 1969 models. When they are operational, they receive 24-hour-a-day use over rough terrain. Most of the vehicles are in poor mechanical condition, especially the 1966 and 1967 models. Transportation personnel have advised that these vehicles cannot be replaced until they are eight years old and accumulate at least 80,000 miles. Our oldest vehicles are not eligible for replacement until 1974. Adequate bench stocking of M-series vehicle parts is not apparent in Thailand.

12. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Friendly: Flare dropping aircraft proved to be very effective even during heavy downpours. USMC helicopters proved to be much more versatile than the fixed wing aircraft. They were also used to clear November Revetment.

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b. Enemy: Reference paragraph 10b(4)(e) this report, the mine contained a double fusing system. EOD is sending the mine to CONUS for study and inclusion in explosive identification manuals.

13. (C) EVALUATION OF OVERALL OPERATION:

a. Action Deserving Commendation:

- (1) Thai Guard running to B-90 to turn in an alarm after being wounded.
- (2) Initial response of on-duty forces.
- (3) Response of off-duty Security Forces and augmentees to CSC.
- (4) Response of USMC helicopters and USAF aircraft.
- (5) Centralized control of the entire operation by CSC.
- (6) Coordination among patrols during the attack and area sweeps.
- (7) US-Thai coordination and support.
- (8) Captures and interrogation of wounded sapper.

b. Areas where improvement is required:

- (1) Vegetation control efforts must be continued on base, and initiated off base.
- (2) Special maintenance support must be initiated for M-series vehicles, especially the extremely valuable M-113.

c. Lessons learned:

- (1) Under the proper conditions of weather and visibility, the enemy can penetrate standard perimeter defenses without being detected. In-depth, random posting thwarted this attack.
- (2) The enemy will resort to guile to accomplish a penetration through normal access gates.

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(3) The enemy did not withdraw as expected. After the lead sappers were trapped and engaged, the remainder of the group made no effort to withdraw until daybreak.

FOR THE COMMANDER


Kenneth J. Kwiatkowski
KENNETH J. KWIATKOSKI, Major, USAF
Chief, Security Police

15. Atch, Photos
1. Map of Sapper Attack
2. Wounded Sapper
3. Remains of Sapper
4. Remains of Sapper
5. Remains of Sapper
6. Enemy Weapon
7. Satchel Charge
8. Satchel Charge
9. Satchel Charges
10. Satchel Charge and Fuse
11. Mine
12. Hand Grenade
13. Cache - Grenades, Satchel Charges, Chemical Pencils & Mine
14. Site of Various Explosions
15. 555 TFS Building

DECLASSIFY ON 31 December 1973

CLASSIFIED BY GINCPACAF Message
dtd 051810Z Oct 72

3 810 X 3 048 M. BEARING N 63° - 17' W



LEGEND MATCH LINE TO AMMO STORAGE AREA

- PENETRATING POINTS
- ▶▶▶ POINTS OF IDENTIFICATION
- ▶▶▶ POINTS OF ESTABLISHMENT
- IMPACT POINTS (OVERLAND / WATER / AIRBORNE)
- ⊕ BUNKERS (M-30)
- J BLOCKING FORCES

1. Map of Sapper Attack



2. wounded Sapper




3. Remains of Sapper



4. Remains of Sapper




8. Remains of Sapper




6 Enemy weapon



7/ Satchel Charge




8. Satchel charge



9. Satchel Charges




10. Satchel charge and Fuse




11. Mine




12. Hand Grenade




13. Cache - Grenade, Satchel Charges,
M16, M19, M20 & Mine



14. Site of Various Explosions



15. 555 TFS Building

MEMO ROUTING SLIP		Never U. - Approvals, Disapprovals, Concurrences, or Similar Actions		ACTION	
1 TO	AF/IGS	INITIALS	CIRCULATE		
		DATE	COORDINATION		
2	S —	FILE			
		INFORMATION			
3	VERY INTERESTING - RB RB	NOTE AND RETURN			
		PER CON- VERSATION			
4		SEE ME			
		SIGNATURE			
REMARKS					
<p>General Searles received the attached from Lt Col Derrington at Udorn and asked that it be forwarded to you for information.</p> 					
FROM		DATE			
Sadie AF/IG		2 Nov 72			
		PHONE			
		74351			

DD FORM 1 OCT 66 95

Replaces DD Form 84, 1 Feb 58, and DD Form 95, 1 Feb 58, which will be used until exhausted. GPO : 1966 O - 295-658

A Brief Summary by SP.

1. The following is a brief summary of the attacks on Ubon and ~~Ubon~~ RTAF bases on the nights of 1 & 3 October.

UBON: At approximately 1530 hrs, 1 October, Thai police clashed with a group of 5 insurgents approximately 16 kilometers east of the base. During the search of the 3 insurgent KIA's, a map was found showing a route from Laos along the Mun River to Ubon airbase and Warren City. The base was notified at 1830 hrs and SECON Yellow was declared at 2118hrs. At 2300hrs, mortar rounds began hitting the northeast end of the base. During the mortar barrage of 36 rounds, security guards in the area reported hearing automatic weapons fire coming from off-base and observed two Thai nationals taking cover and an unknown number of armed individuals on the road near the northeast perimeter. Weapons fire was also heard in the vicinity of the off-base TACAN site and at 0001hrs, the tower notified CSC that the TACAN was out of commission. At 0020 hrs, Thai police and Thai army personnel began sweep operations outside the perimeter and in the area of the TACAN. At first light, investigation revealed that the mortar firing position had been about 390 yds north of the TACAN site and numerous safety wires and caps were found in the area. At the TACAN site, it was discovered that three satchel charges had exploded; one on either side of the support building and one on top. In addition, a number of small arms rounds had hit the TACAN antennae. ~~REP response during and immediately after the attack was satisfactory although the usual communications problems hampered more distant operations later in the day.~~

UBON: ~~Because of the Ubon Attack, Ubon Security Police has implemented a precautionary SECON Yellow for the nights of 1 & 2 October. Full Yellow status was in effect~~ at 0050 hrs, 3 October, a Thai patrol dog handler reported that he had been


attacked by two unidentified individuals in Alpha Sector which encompasses the RTAF, Air America and DepChief area of the base. These two individuals were sighted shortly after in the vicinity of November revetment, between the 432 TRW Hq building and the 555th building and engaged by security forces at approximately 0100 hrs. Attempts to drive the hostiles out of the empty revetment met with small arms and grenade fire which forced the security forces into a defensive holding posture blocking both

their route of advance and retreat. At approximately 0200 hrs automatic weapons fire was reported in Alpha sector and another security team was dispatched for fire support. At 0215 hrs, a large explosion was heard in November revetment and it was later learned that this explosion apparently killed one of the hostiles. It is unknown if the explosion was caused by security force fire directed into the revetment or by the sapper himself. At 0500 hrs, a USMC helicopter hovering over the revetment with USAF riflemen reported the revetment clear and no movement. Security forces then advanced and discovered one hostile apparently KIA and only fragments of the other. Since the intact body had numerous satchel charges around it, EOD was summoned and the body left undisturbed. Between 0530 and 0610, several security sentries reported hostiles exfiltrating the base out of Alpha sector towards the south. Fire could not be directed at these individuals because of friendly forces in the area outside of the base. During the exfiltration, small arms covering fire was received from a group of hostiles off-base. At 0815, the hostile in November revetment, previously believed dead, regained consciousness and moved but was unable to respond to orders to move away from the explosives because of his wounds. On scene security personnel pulled him away and administered first aid until the arrival of an ambulance. Between 0830 and 1100 hrs, 3 Oct, RTG forces sweeping the area southwest of the perimeter killed two more insurgents withdrawing but could not maintain contact with the main body.

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2. In summary, both Ubon and Udorn were in an advanced alert posture when the attacks occurred, which certainly lessened the effectiveness of the attacks and probably deterred a more extensive effort by the attackers. As a result, the damage sustained by US resources was confined to very minor damage to a ^{AC} parking spot and a taxiway at Ubon from mortar hits and the damage to the TACAN antenna. There was virtually no damage to resources at Udorn. RTG response during the attack at Ubon was prompt although limited in its effectiveness. At Udorn, RTAF on-base response was prompt but RTA off-base response was delayed until almost daylight.

In the aftermath of these attacks, RTG - American government activity has been
re-emphasis of the same measure that you sought to achieve during your
tour here. It appears at this point that some progress has been made but only time
will tell just how much. New Joint Base Defense Plans are being developed with a view
toward the US providing assistance in the form of supplemental ration allowances for
RTG patrols and possibly POL and other equipment needs.



NEW AMMO STORAGE AREA

MAY 1950

NEW AMMO STORAGE

